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Abstract Ideas about freedom and related concepts like
autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in
the moral debate about human enhancement interventions.
However, there is not a single understanding of freedom
available, and arguments referring to freedom are simul-
taneously used to argue both for and against enhancement
interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and
polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the
different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and
shows how they relate to one another in order to allow for a
more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identi-
fying the individual underpinnings and the social condi-
tions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient
dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human
enhancement.
Keywords Ethics of human enhancement  Freedom 
Autonomy  Self-determination  Coercion
Introduction
The moral debate about biotechnological interventions to
improve human properties and abilities (‘‘human enhance-
ment’’) includes a number of competing ethical standards of
assessment: considerations of justice come up alongside risk
assessments, as do arguments from maximizing utility or
deontological and anthropological arguments. The freedom of
persons in particular figures prominently in these ethical
debates, for example when it comes to assessing the impli-
cations of enhancing mental abilities with regard to an indi-
vidual’s range of available options for acting, the possibility of
autonomous self-determination or her authenticity.
Yet a closer look at the debate shows that arguments
resting on the concept of freedom are by no means a
homogenous group. To the contrary: the proponents of both
enhancement techniques and of biotechnological absti-
nence, as well as those who position themselves between
these two poles, use the concepts of freedom—and closely
related concepts like autonomy and authenticity—to
explain and justify their respective assessments. In many
cases the arguments even mirror one another with shifting
moral valence: whereas the one side claims the availability
of biotechnological means of improvement has increased
individual freedom, the other side seeks to show that in fact
the opposite is true, that it minimizes freedom. This puz-
zling and often confusing situation leads us to ask what
conceptual presuppositions are being made by each of
these often contradictory justifications and which aspects
of freedom they centre on.
In this paper we attempt to identify those dimensions of
the complex notion of freedom that are particularly salient
in the debate about human enhancement. In order to
achieve this aim we start by analysing and discussing dif-
ferent ways of appealing to the issue of freedom in the
enhancement debate—with its different dimensions of
range of options, degrees of coercion, self-determination
and authenticity. First (1) we describe the central lines of
argumentation taken by both the proponents and opponents
of biotechnological interventions, and then (2) point to a
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striking symmetry in the organisation of these arguments.
Next (3) we turn to the question of whether one can
legitimately speak of a unified conception of freedom
within the enhancement debate, or whether one needs to
draw distinctions that ultimately make it impossible to
bring all the different uses of the notion of freedom under a
common denominator. We conclude (4) by arguing that it
is necessary to clearly distinguish the different under-
standings which are subsumed under the umbrella notion of
‘‘freedom’’ and identify those related to the individual
underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and
decision-making as particularly important in the current
ethical debate.
The function of ‘‘freedom’’ in the enhancement debate
The normative debate about ‘‘human enhancement’’ cen-
tres around the question of how to morally evaluate when
humans ‘‘improve’’ themselves with the help of biotech-
nological interventions. These improvements include psy-
chopharmaceutical interventions to optimize cognitive
abilities or emotional moods, but the term ‘‘enhancement’’
is also frequently used to refer to modifications to the
human genome, technological changes to the brain, and
invasively equipping the human organism with techno-
logical devices.
This ethical question obviously involves conceptual diffi-
culties as well: what exactly is ‘‘enhancement’’; how can the
concept be precisely defined in view of the diversity of pos-
sible interventions? Does it refer to a single unified phenom-
enon at all (Bostrom and Savulescu 2009)? Are there
‘‘natural’’ limits that are inherently valuable (Agar 2010; Pa-
rens 1995)? We do not intend to discuss these questions here.
We will make use of a minimal definition and take enhance-
ment measures to be intentional, positively assessed bio-
technological interventions in the human organism that serve
the goal of either producing certain qualities or optimizing
extant abilities (Heilinger 2010).
In the following we focus on a particular aspect of the
enhancement issue: the connection between enhancement
interventions and human freedom. We do not aim to
answer the overarching question of which standard of
assessment is best suited to normatively evaluating acts of
enhancement. Rather we assume that no single general
normative theory—such as utilitarianism or deontology—
and no single criterion—such as the calculation of harm
and benefit or the characterization of the ‘‘natural’’ state of
humans—are sufficient for such evaluation. We hold that
the mixture of evaluative approaches in the ethical dis-
cussion, which compete with each other to some extent and
complement each other to some extent, is suited to the
complexity and novelty of the problem.
Yet it is striking that so-called arguments from freedom
seem almost indispensable to any assessment of enhance-
ment interventions. There seem to be several reasons for
this: biotechnological interventions to improve individual
abilities are always actions, which as such can be per-
formed freely or under coercion. Since these biotechno-
logical interventions are generally medical measures which
frequently can only be performed by experts (e.g. surgical
interventions), the decision for or against undergoing such
interventions is subject to the condition of free and
informed consent. Moreover enhancement techniques often
aim to change abilities that can in turn have repercussions
for the exercise of individual freedom. How a person
decides and the criteria used in reaching the decision
depend essentially on emotional, cognitive and volitional
conditions that can be changed with the help of biotech-
nological methods. And in addition, the repercussions of
enhancement measures on the autonomy of conduct often
affect not just the isolated agent who decides in favour of a
certain intervention, but also the social environment as
well, since decisions are always made within a social
space.
Here we can already see that the issue touches upon
various dimensions of freedom. The philosophical discus-
sion of semantic distinctions has a long tradition (Kane
2003).1 It is typical to distinguish between a positive and a
negative definition of the concept of freedom (Berlin
1969). In its negative sense ‘‘freedom’’ refers to the
absence of inner or outer compulsion, which is usually
expressed by the term ‘‘freedom of action’’. The positive
concept of freedom in contrast refers to persons’ abilities to
make decisions independently of what has been previously
given and thus corresponds to the meaning of ‘‘freedom of
the will’’. This second understanding is closely connected
to and partly overlaps with the concept of ‘‘autonomy’’,
which describes the ability to determine and control one’s
choices and actions (Christman 2011). Such fundamental
distinctions are helpful but lead to the question of which
aspects of freedom the various debates focus on and take as
premises. Without presupposing any rigid definition of
human freedom ourselves, we will begin with an overview
of various arguments and types of argument found in the
discussion that draw on different varieties of the notion of
freedom in their central statements.
1 In the philosophical debate the words ‘‘freedom’’, ‘‘liberty’’, and
‘‘free will’’ are used rather as interchangeable. The conceptual
distinctions made are independent of the terminology chosen.
Attempts to introduce substantial distinctions between ‘‘liberty’’ and
‘‘freedom’’ were unsuccessful. Cf. Carter 2012.
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Arguments for enhancement: preserving or expanding
freedom
It stands to reason that arguments in favour of the use of
enhancement techniques would make use of the concept of
freedom. Firstly, the semantics of ‘‘improving individual
abilities’’ seems to already imply the notion of freedom: in
improving oneself, one ‘frees’ oneself, it would seem, from
(naturally) given limitations. And secondly, the availability
of such improvements constitutes ‘‘additional’’ possibilities
for actions and decisions.
(?1) One argument emphasizes that the mere availability
of biotechnological procedures of improvement expands the
individual’s options. The biotechnological procedures, inso-
far as they are available, are actions that the individual can opt
for. This general characterization on its own does not require
any consideration of the consequences or intended goals of the
actions in question. When an individual gains access to
medical measures such as neurosurgical interventions or
pharmaceuticals, these measures as such present the individ-
ual with additional options for action (Bostrom and Sandberg
2009). The central premise here is that a larger number of
possible actions means an expansion of the individual free-
dom of action. It could be objected that the principle conflates
quantity and quality in a manner that is problematic or at least
needs justification: an expansion of our options—such as is
promised by the advertising for consumer products, for
example—at most suggests greater freedom. Yet we are
merely given the pretence of alternatives. However, such
general worries could be met with examples from other areas
and other analogies, such as that a greater set of truly available
educational options without a doubt expands the individual’s
freedom of choice and action (Malhotra and Schuler 2005).
(?2) Another argument states that biotechnological
improvements allow an individual to free him- or herself
from the contingent preconditions that hinder the devel-
opment of his or her own abilities—and thus the chances of
being successful in life. This argument rests on the
empirical insight that many of the factors (sometimes
inauspicious) that shape our lives are not in our individual
control; e.g. the social environment the individual is born
into has varying effects on the person’s cognitive and
emotional development. Yet if improvement measures are
available, a person can use them to correct some of the
prior disadvantageous influences to purposefully and
deliberately influence his or her abilities. Now the exercise
of control over one’s own action and conduct represents a
necessary condition for autonomous decisions. Hence, it is
concluded, the (self-determined) use of biotechnological
improvement measures to overcome prior negative condi-
tions favours the exercise of freedom, since it allows us to
overcome unjustified inequalities and limitations (Bucha-
nan et al. 2000).
(?3) However, most arguments that make use of the
concept of freedom to bring out the advantages of
enhancement techniques refer to freedom of the will and
self-determination and not so much to freedom of action.
Since the formation of an autonomous will rests on mental
abilities, many arguments limit themselves to neuro-
enhancement procedures, that is, to interventions in the
neuronal processes to improve executive functions (Bo-
strom 2008).
For example, there is an argument that improved cog-
nitive abilities can lead to more rational and in conse-
quence ‘freer’ decisions and accordingly to ‘freer’ actions.
Someone who makes decisions rationally possesses a set of
consistent reasons for action composed of motivating
desires and convictions. The central assumption of this
argument is that a person with greater cognitive clarity,
caused e.g. by attention-increasing medications, is better
able to generate such a consistency in the content of their
reasons for action (Crone 2006): someone with an
increased capacity for attention and greater clarity of
thought can more easily critically assess immediate
impulses for action (first-order desires) in light of convic-
tions e.g. about the contextual conditions and the possible
consequences of the actions, and to choose a motivating
desire accordingly and allow it to guide their action (the
formation of second-order volitions)2. According to this
argument, this capability represents an expansion of indi-
vidual freedom, as it allows the individual to purposefully
make a rational decision and thus avoid acting under the
dictates of impulses and drives.
(?4) There are similar arguments claiming that
enhancement methods such as the use of psychopharma-
ceuticals when not medically indicated could allow people
to be more authentic, i.e. to be ‘themselves’ to a greater
extent (DeGrazia 2004; Kramer 1997; Levy 2011). This
view is supported by the assumption that people generally
possess a ‘genuine’ personality, a set of character traits that
distinguishes them from other people. This genuine per-
sonality, it is assumed, is however not always able to
develop freely on its own but gets ‘covered over’. The use
of psychopharmaceuticals can eliminate these ‘superim-
positions’ and help people towards an authentic, coherent
conduct (Juth 2011). Thus the point of the argument is that
people have a higher degree of self-determination if with
the help of biotechnological enhancement methods they are
enabled to recognize their genuine desires, identify with
them and guide their action by these desires.3
2 For the distinction between first- and second-order volitions cf.
Frankfurt 1971.
3 A somewhat parallel argument is endorsed when discussing the
possibility to ‘‘morally enhance’’ people to help them uncover their
moral side and overcome their immoral weaknesses (cf. Persson and
Savulescu 2011 and a critical discussion in Harris 2011).
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(?5) Enhancement interventions could also help over-
coming constraints to participating in society. Given that
the ‘‘natural lottery’’ endowed individuals differently with
cognitive and physical abilities, the use of enhancement
technologies could also help to level the playing field and
overcome disadvantages that have a negative impact on the
exertion of one’s freedom (Buchanan et al. 2000). We do
no longer have to accept that some are smarter than others
and hence take the lead in making decisions for all. With
the help of enhancement interventions it becomes possible
to allow also the less capable to make up their relative
impairments and engage freely and on equal terms with
those who have been preferred by the natural lottery.
(?6) In an interesting side-line of the moral debate
about enhancement interventions from a religious per-
spective, some have argued that using these means in order
to improve and shape human nature would be perfectly in
line with a God-willed human capacity for human self-
improvement.4 The use of biotechnological means can
hence be seen as following the divine command to take
responsibility for the human lot. Furthermore a creative
human being realises the idea that God created humans in
his image: him being a creator, a human being as ‘‘imago
dei’’ is meant to be creative and to continue the divine
creation.
Arguments against enhancement: constraining
or loosing freedom
Besides the above-mentioned positions that see an increase
or at least a conservation of human freedom in the use of
enhancement technologies, there are many critical argu-
ments that also appeal to notions of freedom. Essentially
most of these arguments amount to the claim that the use of
enhancement techniques curtails individual freedom or
even undermines it entirely.
(-1) One argument expresses doubt that expanding
options for action actually brings with it an increase in free-
dom. The objection made against this optimistic assessment is
that the existence of certain new options for action drives
individuals to take these options through more or less subtly
exercised social pressure. The increasing prevalence of
enhancement interventions would lead to increasing pressure
to subject oneself to these interventions even for those who
personally had decided against the use of biotechnology. For
example, if in today’s society of achievement one’s profes-
sional prospects are closely coupled to a certain level of
cognitive performance, the individual’s choice for or against
an enhancement procedure becomes a decision for or against a
certain job; thus a quantitative expansion of the number of
options for action can lead to a factual restriction of the
(socially acceptable) options.5 (Bostrom and Roache 2011).
These sorts of sometimes subtle and sometimes very
powerful influences on individual behaviour are not new;
they range from the pressure on schoolchildren to dress
similarly to the pressure to finally get a cell phone—if one
doesn’t wish to be excluded from the community. These
decisions are made under the influence of external factors
in a strong sense. This points to a social dimension of
individual freedom of decision. Of course no one disputes
that individual decisions are always influenced partly by
the particular social environment, but the argument sup-
poses that the new possibilities for biotechnological inter-
vention generate a special type of limitation of our freedom
of decision (Greely 2011; Lev 2009; Mehlman 2009).
(-2) Enhancement interventions that are forced upon
people represent an obvious limitation of people’s freedom,
both in its positive and its negative form. They limit the pursuit
of one’s own aims and they restrict the available options to do
so. Even if the danger for such enforcements seems to be
relatively small in contemporary Western democracies,6 they
are frequently mentioned in the debate.7 Yet, the diverse
possibilities for ‘‘eugenic’’ interventions typically feared in
such arguments presuppose the existence of a (quasi-) totali-
tarian setting and it seems to be the exertion of external force
which appears as the primary source of concern here, less the
actual enhancement intervention themselves.
The argument runs as follows: even under the assump-
tion that such biotechnological interventions in fact had
positive repercussions (whereby it is unclear what standard
would underlie such an assessment) and that only inter-
ventions with positive repercussions would be carried out,
these interventions would still violate the individual’s
freedom and decision-making competence, if the affected
persons have not given their consent to the intervention.
The model of freedom pertinent here sees freedom as
self-determination over one’s own body and thus over the
interventions carried out on that body. The model of
informed consent based on this notion of freedom is a high
ethical standard in medical ethics, holding that medical
interventions are only allowed when the patient has
explicitly given his or her informed consent. Exceptions to
4 ‘‘Responsible creativity is playing human as God intends us to.’’
Peters (2003, 198).
5 See the discussion whether using cognitive enhancements consti-
tutes cheating, for example in Bostrom and Roache 2011.
6 If at all one could only imagine ‘‘liberal eugenics’’ in this context
Agar (2004).
7 Cf. the frequent references to Aldous Huxley’s distopian novel
Brave New World in the literature (e.g. in The President’s Council on
Bioethics 2003). However, this is not a well-chosen example to
express concern about restrictions for freedom through enhancement,
since the biotechnical interventions in the novel aim primarily at
decreasing the abilities of some in order to have enough people doing
unsatisfying work.
16 J.-C. Heilinger, K. Crone
123
this declaration of consent can only be made under pre-
cisely defined conditions, such as when the person’s power
of judgment has been severely impaired due to mental
disturbances; in these cases an attempt is made to deter-
mine the will of the affected person through a
representative.
Another exception to the requirement of informed
consent is the treatment of children (that is, persons who
are not yet capable of making decisions). Here as well
the aim is to make a decision in the best interests of the
children through a representative. However, such thera-
peutic interventions are performed in the absence of
informed consent. Given the understanding of freedom as
the absence of coercion that this argument rests on, the
question of whether an intervention performed without
informed consent is coercive is decided by the question
of whether the intervention is in what is guessed to be
the best informed interest of the affected person (Manson
and O’Neill 2007). Yet there is always the risk that the
interventions are carried out based on other people’s
ideas that do not agree with those of the affected person.
And in the absence of informed consent this holds for
the procedures carried out on children and grown indi-
viduals as well. Both cases would involve insufficient
regard for freedom as self-determination over one’s own
body.
Hence it is concluded that biotechnological optimization
measures not based on the explicit consent of the affected
individuals should be rejected in principle due to the risk of
undermining individual self-determination.
(-3) A further objection against enhancement technol-
ogies is that the extreme use of such technologies could
lead to a transformation of increased cognitive abilities into
limitations of rational abilities. The argument rests on the
premise that self-determined and autonomous actions
require a sound assessment of the available options for
action, which presupposes a certain measure of cognitive
and mnemonic abilities: making a justified decision to
carry out a certain action means evaluating one’s own
desires, knowing and weighing various options for action
and comparing them against previous experiences.
Enhancement technologies can have the aim of boosting
the cognitive or mnemonic performance of the human brain
and thus might favourably affect this decision-making
capacity. However, an extreme increase in cognitive abil-
ities could also lead to a dysfunctional and thus reduced
decision-making ability. The argument for this is empiri-
cal: for example, Alexandr Luria’s studies on the hyper-
mnemonic abilities of his patient ‘‘S’’ show that due to his
extremely good memory he was no longer able to forget
experiences and impressions. Even trivialities were bran-
ded into his memories and thus continually present. This
made it impossible for him to make decisions; he was
incapable of living his life without external aid (Luria
1968).
This sceptical argument against the extreme use of
biotechnological improvement measures focuses on the
cognitive foundation of freedom as self-determined
authorship of action: a significant increase in mental abil-
ities could, it is feared, compromise the foundation of
autonomous actions.
(-4) Another sceptical objection against the use of
enhancement techniques focuses on a different aspect of
freedom, seeing freedom not as the precondition of rational
conduct but as its result. On this view the freedom to do or
not do certain things is not just the starting point of all
human actions but is at the same time a consequence of
prior human efforts. On this account the ability to play
piano, for example, or to conduct a complicated surgical
operation, is the result of long and painstaking practice and
training. Only at the end of this learning process is the
individual free in this sense: due to the efforts of the will
and long years of practice the person is now able to per-
form a certain action that he or she would otherwise have
been unable to perform. This also holds for certain mental
states that are qualified as ‘‘free’’ in a sense, such as
‘‘Buddhistic equanimity’’, which also arises through prior
effort and practice. Thus the acquisition of abilities and the
achievement of certain mental states are the result of
individual efforts. Yet it is argued that the potential use of
enhancement technologies render this individual develop-
ment and self-discipline impossible: there would simply no
longer be any necessity for this sort of will-power whereby
one achieves certain goals and abilities oneself, if there
were a biotechnological ‘‘short-cut’’ to these same goals.
Yet this devalues the ‘‘freedom’’ for certain actions for-
merly won through practice. As the mere results of a
technical intervention they are no longer an expression of
genuine human freedom (Buchanan 2009). Rather actions
based on technical self-optimizations have more of the
character of automated processes (Sandel 2007).
(-5) Other arguments see freedom as a precondition for
participating with one’s fellows in the process of negoti-
ating social rules and norms together (Habermas 1983).
Habermas develops an argument against the use of genetic
technology for genetic improvements in prenatal individ-
uals within the framework of discourse ethics (Habermas
2003). On his view the possibility that some individuals
would possess certain abilities and traits with the aid of
biotechnologies leads to an ‘‘asymmetric communicative
situation’’ in which we can no longer proceed on the
assumption that all individuals participating in the dis-
course are essentially of the same type. The divergent
‘‘prehistory’’ of those who have been biotechnologically
improved and those who haven’t been would mean that the
participants in the discourse could no longer view
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themselves as basically belonging to the same type. Hab-
ermas justifies this by reference to the asymmetry in the
individuals’ status as ends in themselves that would result:
whereas those whose genesis had not been tampered with
would exist as ends in themselves, those who owe their
existence to the use of biotechnology would exist as the
result of others’ planned actions. This puts the latter in a
subordinate position and they could no longer participate in
the negotiation processes of discourse ethics on par with
the others.
Hence this argument articulates a fear that the individual
freedom of the affected individuals—a freedom consisting
in the equal entitlement to participation in the discourse—
will be impaired, as this freedom will be replaced by a
‘‘social dependency that, because it is ascriptively
anchored, is irreversible’’, that represents ‘‘a foreign body
within the reciprocal and symmetrical relations of recog-
nition in a moral and legal community of free and equal
persons’’ (Habermas 2003, pp. 65, our emphasis).
(-6) An additional sceptical argument against biotechno-
logical enhancement interventions rests on a different under-
standing of freedom, namely as the ability to relate oneself in a
meaningful way to all that is beyond one’s control, that is to
develop respect or even gratitude for ‘‘the Given’’ (Sandel
2007). In light of the contingency of the world, which bears
inconveniences and problems for every human life, freedom
consists precisely in acting under the condition that we accept
these intractable and uncontrollable circumstances.
This idea is found in Christian theological approaches, for
example, where the insight into the insufficiency of human
knowledge and ability compared to divine omnipotence is
interpreted as a free act of self-chosen subordination under a
higher power. Now when the contingencies of the life-world
are brought under the domain of human planning with the help
of biotechnologies, this is a new empowerment for humanity;
yet at the same time this prevents humans from freely acqui-
escing to the divine will. Hence it is concluded that
enhancement actions impede our freedom in this sense.
‘‘Freedom’’: a shifting concept
This presentation of the arguments for and against
enhancement that make use of the notion of freedom looks,
in summary, as follows in Table 1.
This line-up suggests a striking symmetry. Each free-
dom-related type of argument for the use of enhancements
seems to correspond to a similar counter-argument cate-
gorically rejecting such use. However, it is questionable
whether there really is such an argumentative symmetry:
does each of the arguments lined up against one another
indeed rest on the same premises, do they use the same
understanding of ‘‘freedom’’?
We should first note that the concept of freedom
(without additional qualification) is obviously semantically
vague and thus can be integrated into various semantic
contexts. This is already shown by the distinction between
freedom of action and freedom of the will and the
dimensions of autonomy and authenticity. Hence there are
a variety of conceptions of freedom; and we find this same
semantic diversity of ‘‘freedom’’ reflected in the various
arguments within the enhancement debate.
One might attempt to systematize the arguments by
reducing the different uses of the term ‘‘freedom’’ to a
single meaning. However, this might have the consequence
that either individual semantic nuances get lost by the
wayside, or else that, to prevent this, we would end up with
a broad, general and thus rather uninformative formulation.
So is there nothing more to say about the so-called argu-
ments from freedom found in the enhancement debates
except that they use the concept of freedom in various
different senses that can hardly be compared with each
other?
Despite this diversity it is possible to classify the various
uses of the concept of freedom. For there are several points
where we can ascertain a complementary relation between
a positive and a negative assessment linked to the particular
use of the concept of freedom. Here it is also relevant to
ask whether—and if so, to what extent—conceptual or
empirical justifications are used for the particular assess-
ment. This can bring out the reasons for the different uses
of the concept.
The argument that new options represent an expansion
of the freedom of action, formulated in general terms, is
largely undisputed. If we understand freedom of action in
this sense, the argument (?1) is a perhaps somewhat trivial
but nonetheless uncontested argument that the new possi-
bilities of enhancement bring with them an expansion of
freedom. Yet what is in dispute is whether these new
options for action are primarily to be seen positively as the
overcoming of coercive powers that existed previously
(?2) or negatively as a new potential for coercing indi-
viduals—either indirectly (-1) or directly (-2). Hence the
appeal to freedom of action can coincide with a positive
and a negative assessment of the enhancement options. The
former case involves conceptual argumentation: freedom
of action means being able to act without hindrances, that
is, having as many options as possible; the latter case draws
on an empirical consideration, namely that in real life—
normally—a broader set of options for action may impede
individual freedom.
Moreover the assessment of the relevance of possible
enhancement actions for the exercise of individual freedom of
the will can also vary: some see the use of enhancement
techniques positively as favouring the foundations of auton-
omous decision-making by improving the conditions under
18 J.-C. Heilinger, K. Crone
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which rational, well-founded, free decisions of the will can be
made (?3), while others object that the currently ‘‘normal’’
cognitive set is optimal for decision-making, such that all
changes—even increases—in our cognitive powers could
ultimately impair our ability to form our will autonomously by
disturbing the ‘‘equilibrium’’ that our cognitive capacities
require (-3). In both of these cases the assessment rests on
empirical considerations.
The influence that enhancement measures could have on
individual authenticity, on an individual’s personality, is
also assessed variously. Whereas some people warn of the
dangers of estrangement and point out that the use of
biotechnologies undermines one’s own sense of merit for
one’s actions, abilities and traits (-4), others argue that the
use of enhancements can significantly help people to find
and develop their ‘‘own self’’ (?4). Here we again find
contrary assessments of the expected effects of enhance-
ment interventions on whether and how individuals see
themselves as authentic; and these contrary assessments
also rest on empirical considerations.
Also with regard to the free interaction of individuals on
equal terms, the use of enhancement interventions is said to
have have both a positive and a negative impact: While some
hope that the use of enhancement interventions will help
levelling the playing field and allow those less favoured by the
‘‘natural lottery’’ to cooperate with the more lucky on equal
terms (?5), others fear that these very interventions make
communication on equal terms impossible (-5).
The religiously inspired debate is equally divided: Some
hold that the use of enhancement interventions is an
expression of hubris and lack of respect for the given (-6)
while others have argued that using such means is fulfilling
the creative project God has initiated before handing it over
to humans themselves who are free to choose how to go on
with it (?6).
Conceptual and empirical dimensions of ‘‘freedom’’
in the enhancement debate
The differences among the arguments for and against
enhancement that appeal to freedom have several causes.
They are to be explained by the fact that to some extent the
various arguments specify the notion of freedom differ-
ently, and also by the fact that empirical considerations,
together with conceptual considerations, often play a role
in the conclusions.
On this diagnosis it does not seem suitable to speak of a
‘‘unified’’ group of arguments from freedom. This would
require that we find a sufficiently unified specification of
freedom that could then be differentiated into various
facets. However, our examination here has shown that
freedom is a multi-dimensional ‘‘cluster concept’’ com-
prising diverse aspects of which we have identified
some without claiming to have offered a comprehensive
list. Thus the various discussed senses of the concept of
freedom—freedom of action, freedom of the will, decision-
making freedom—each have their own particular signifi-
cance for the content of the arguments in the enhancement
debate. This is shown by the fact that claims involving
various senses of freedom can all be weighed against each
other: thus we could easily imagine positively assessing the
expansion of freedom of action that comes with the
availability of new options for action while at the same
time seeing in the extreme manipulation of memory a
restriction of the freedom of the will that is to be assessed
negatively. The different approaches might be incommen-
surable but do not for that reason have to be incompatible.
Hence the non-trivial specification of a unified ‘‘core’’
turns out to be problematic.
What consequences does it have that we can apply such
heterogeneous conceptions of freedom to morally assess
enhancement interventions? It is questionable whether
there can even be such a thing as clear-cut judgments in
such circumstances. In view of the diversity of concepts of
freedom it seems that the only suitable judgments are
perspective-dependent ones that, moreover, require
empirical information for a (provisional) conclusion of the
judgment. Thus if we ask, for example, whether the use of
memory pills would increase the possibility of self-deter-
mined actions, we would first need to examine precisely
which increase in memory would produce which sort of
improved capacity for judgment. Such fine grained analysis
is very different from more general claims about increasing
Table 1 Overview of the
freedom-related arguments in
the moral assessment of
enhancement interventions
Pro enhancement Contra enhancement
?1. More and new options -1. Subtle (social) pressure restricting options
?2. Fewer constraints on action -2. Direct coercion (no informed consent)
?3. Control over second-order volitions -3. Overburdening through excess information
?4. Greater authenticity -4. No authorship of one’s own achievements
?5. Level playing field -5. Asymmetrical communicative situation
?6. Theological: realising God-willed capacities -6. Theological: loss of free subordination to divine
plan
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freedom or autonomy overall. Since these cases might also
force us to account for individual differences, we could
hardly expect to arrive at any comprehensive and general
judgment; our judgment might only apply to individual
cases.
Thus the main result we can take away from the dis-
cussion presented here is to note that enhancement actions
can have both a positive and a negative influence on human
freedom—be it freedom of action or freedom of the will. In
each individual case we would have to examine more
precisely how concrete enhancement interventions impinge
upon the various dimensions of freedom in order to arrive
at a sophisticated, conceptually clear and empirically
informed judgment. The examples of distinctions within
the concept of freedom that we drew here should help to
provide some orientation by showing how so-called argu-
ments from freedom are structured and how they work in
the enhancement debate.
Conclusion
The concepts of freedom and autonomy are prevalent in the
debate over biotechnological improvements in human
abilities and play a central role. It is striking that the
concept of freedom gets used in arguments both for and
against enhancement techniques, which raises the question
of why such a heterogeneous situation emerges. This paper
aimed to shed more light on the structure and the implicit
presuppositions of so-called arguments from freedom in the
moral debate about human enhancement. We saw that the
concept of freedom not only is used in various senses, but
moreover is often coupled with empirical statements as
well. Thus the semantic openness of the concept ‘‘free-
dom’’ allows for a diverse array of interpretive possibilities
through contextual adaptation. The individual arguments
usually pick out a specific aspect of the concept of freedom
and neglect other senses. Hence the attempt to identify a
single general specification of ‘‘freedom’’ compatible with
all of its uses would be misguided: it could only result in an
insufficiently complex construction unsuited to the phe-
nomenon it intends to analyse and assess. Instead it is best
to account for the diverse dimensions of freedom mani-
fested in the arguments in these ethical debates by means of
a conceptually explicit and empirically informed analysis.
One of the specific characteristics of arguments from
freedom is their multi-dimensionality.
Having identified these several dimensions, it never-
theless is possible to rank them according to different
degrees of salience. Particularly salient for a discussion of
the ethical legitimacy of enhancement interventions in
liberal societies will be arguments focusing on the under-
pinnings of autonomous choices (?3 and -1), and
basically egalitarian considerations of levelling the playing
field in order to remove unjust constraints for some (?5).
Other arguments such as direct coercion (-2), seem to be
less salient in liberal societies that are per definition soci-
eties in which totalitarian coercion does not take place;
neither are theologian arguments (?6 and -6) particularly
salient under liberal conditions, since religious preferences
are seen as private choices that are not capable of providing
general arguments for all members of a society that is rich
in diverse world views.
In liberal societies it is relatively undisputed that the
individual underpinnings and the social conditions of
choice and decision-making are central elements of human
freedom. The ethical debate about the impact of enhance-
ment interventions on freedom should hence first and
foremost tackle these dimensions.
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